Abstract: Individual-specific
Introduction
Why do governments so often fail to adopt economic policies that economists consider efficiency-enhancing? This is the question addressed in an influential paper by Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik (1991) . They argue that one of the reasons why governments often dismiss reform is that individual winners and loser cannot be identified beforehand.
This generates individual-specific uncertainty which leads to a bias against efficiencyenhancing economic policies and towards the status quo.
Fernandez and Rodrik (FR) first illustrate their point using an example and then develop it more precisely using a trade-model which, they argue, generalizes their example and puts it into a general-equilibrium context. The basic point of their introductory example can be easily illustrated by the following (somewhat different but simpler) example. Assume that there is an economic policy which, if put into place, increases the income of a fraction 01 a << of the population by an amount equal to 0 g > and decreases the income of all others by an amount 0 l < . Suppose that the policy is adopted if a majority votes in favour and rejected otherwise. These assumptions combined imply that if all individuals know whether they will gain or lose at the time they vote-i.e. there is no individual-specific uncertainty-then the new economic policy will be supported by a fraction a of voters and enacted if and only if 1/2 a ≥ . Now suppose that people do not know with certainty whether they will gain or loose at the time they vote-i.e. there is individual-specific uncertainty. Instead, voters only know that a fraction a of them will gain 0 g > while all others will loose 0 l < , and they therefore conclude that the probability p of being among the winners is equal to a . Consequently, risk-neutral agents will vote in favour of the policy if and only if their expected gain (1) agal π =+− is positive. This implies that support for the economic policy in this static example may be greater or smaller with individual-specific uncertainty than without. In particular, support for the policy will be greater (smaller) with individual-specific uncertainty than without if the expected gain is positive (strictly negative). The economic policy may therefore be enacted with individualspecific uncertainty in cases it would have been rejected without and vice-versa. FR find exactly the same result in their static example and therefore conclude that, in a static scenario, individual-specific uncertainty does neither generate a bias against reform nor lead to an asymmetry between the case with individual-specific uncertainty and the case without.
 2  FR argue that an asymmetry between these two cases will, however, arise naturally in a dynamic, two-period model. To see why suppose that the economic policy is put to vote twice: in the beginning of the first period and, again, in the beginning of the second period. Assume also that those who will gain g in each period where the economic policy is in place are a fraction a of the electorate. All remaining voters will lose 0 l < in each period where the economic policy is in place. Finally, suppose that there are no costs of enacting or reversing the policy and that voters apply a discount rate 0 δ ≥ to second period payoffs. Consider first the situation where voters know in the beginning of the first period whether they gain or loose from the economic policy. In this case, the following equilibria emerge. If 1/2 a ≥ , then voters anticipate that the policy will be passed in the beginning of the second period whether or not it has been passed in the beginning of the first period. This implies that a fraction 1/2 a ≥ of voters know that their discounted gain of the economic policy being enacted in the beginning of the first period is (1) g δ + .
Consequently, the policy will be enacted in the first period and sustained in the second period. If 1/2 a < , however, then the policy will be rejected in the beginning of the first period and rejected again in the beginning of the second period. The situation is somewhat more complex in the case with individual-specific uncertainty. In the beginning of the first period, voters only know the fraction of people who will gain or loose from the policy but not whether they will be among the winners or losers. They also realize, however, that if the policy is put into place during the first period, then everybody finds out about being either a winner or loser and votes accordingly when trade-reform is put to vote again in the beginning of the second period. Consequently, voters anticipate in the beginning of the first period that if the economic policy is enacted, then it will be sustained in the election in the beginning of the second period if and only if 1/2 a ≥ . Hence, if 1/2 a ≥ , then voters know that their expected discounted gain of the economic policy being enacted in the beginning of the first period is (1) δπ
, on the other hand, then voters know that their expected discounted gain of passing the policy in the first period is π ; this is because the economic policy, if enacted in the first period, will not find enough support to be sustained in the beginning of the second period. Combining these two cases yields that if voters are risk-neutral, then the policy will be enacted in the beginning of the first period if 0 π ≥ (and be sustained in the beginning of the second period if and only if 1/2 a ≥ ) and rejected in the beginning of the first period if 0 π < . If the economic policy is rejected in the beginning of the first period, then it will be rejected again in the beginning of the second period as no new information about the identity of winners and losers becomes available. The next table summarizes all equilibria. 
The table illustrates that in the two-period example there is an asymmetry in how individual-specific uncertainty affects economic policies that would have been in place in the second period under certainty compared to how it affects policies that would not have been in place in the second period under certainty. If an economic policy would not have been in place in the second period under certainty, it will not be in place with individualspecific uncertainty. On the other hand, if a policy would have been in place in the second period under certainty, it might not be in place with individual-specific uncertainty. This is the asymmetry that FR argue explains why individual-specific uncertainty works against efficiency-enhancing policies in a dynamic scenario. In fact, Table 1 shows that this asymmetry implies that the policy is less likely to be in place in the second period with individual-specific uncertainty than without.
1
It is interesting to note, however, that individual-specific uncertainty does not work against efficiency-enhancing policies, i.e. reform, in the example of Table 1. 2 Instead, individual-specific uncertainty only works against economic policies that strictly decrease aggregate income. To see this clearly notice that the policy is less likely to be in place with individual-specific uncertainty than without because if 0 π < , then the economic policy is rejected in both periods in the case with individual-specific uncertainty even if 1/2 a ≥ .
Moreover, 0 π < if and only if the policy strictly decreases aggregate income, i.e.
(1)0 agal +−< . Hence, the economic policy is less likely to be in place with individualspecific uncertainty than without only because, with individual-specific uncertainty, it will be rejected if it strictly decreases aggregate income. Individual-specific uncertainty 1 There is an alternative reading of FR's use of the "asymmetry", "bias towards the status-quo", and "bias against reform" introduced by individual-specific uncertainty. This reading is that they only refer to following two facts: (I) with individual-specific uncertainty, reform may be enacted in the first period and revoked in the second period, while reform will always be sustained if enacted under certainty; (II) reform will be rejected in the second period if rejected in the first period whether or not there is individual-specific uncertainty. This definition implies that, as long as (I) and (II) hold, individual-specific uncertainty will introduce a bias towards the status-quo in the "alternative FR sense" even if the status-quo is overturned for a set of model-parameters that have 99% probability with individual-specific uncertainty but only 1% probability under certainty. Similarly, individual-specific uncertainty would introduce a bias against reform in the "alternative FR sense" even if reform is enacted and sustained for parameters that have 99% probability with uncertainty but only 1% probability under certainty. 2 Reform is defined as a change for the better or an improvement in the 4 th Edition of The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language.
 4  therefore only works against change to the worse. If the economic policy results in a change to the better-i.e. increases aggregate income-then the policy is as likely to be in place in the second period in the case with individual-specific uncertainty than in the case without. Combined, these last two results yield that enacted economic policies are strictly more likely to increase aggregate income with individual-specific uncertainty than without.
3
Individual-specific uncertainty therefore decreases the probability that efficiency-enhancing policies are enacted but, at the same time, increases the probability that enacted policies are efficiency-enhancing in the example in Table 1 .
The result that individual-specific uncertainty only works against economic policies that strictly decrease aggregate income is the main difference between the example in Table   1 and a two-period version of FR's introductory example. In a two-period version of their example, individual-specific uncertainty will work both against policies that decrease aggregate income and policies that increase aggregate income. Hence, in their example, enacted policies will be less likely to increase aggregate efficiency with individual-specific uncertainty than without if and only if the probability of uncertainty leading to the rejection of efficiency-enhancing policies is greater than the probability of uncertainty leading to the rejection of policies decreasing aggregate efficiency. individual-specific uncertainty and reform is enacted in the first period, then support for sustaining trade-reform in the beginning of second period (when all individual-specific uncertainty has been resolved) will be greater than support for enacting reform in the first period under certainty; for comparison, in a two-period version of FR's introductory example as well as the example in Table 1 , second-period support for a reform enacted in the first period with individual-specific uncertainty will be identical to support for the policy in the first period under certainty. This feature of FR's two-period trade-model implies that reform may find enough support to be sustained in the second period, even if it would not have found enough support to be enacted in the first period had there been no individualspecific uncertainty. The intuition for this result is simple. Once trade-reform has been enacted, some of the workers who would have voted against it under certainty will nevertheless switch to the sector that gains (even if they have not incurred any sunk cost).
These workers will vote against revoking trade-reform in the future. This argument applies to any type of reform. In a realistic setting, reform will increase the incentives of economic agents to move into those economic activities that benefit from the new economic policies.
If some agents respond to these incentives, then support for sustaining reform in future elections (when individual-specific uncertainty has been resolved) will be greater than support for enacting reform in the case without individual-specific uncertainty.
This explains why reform, once enacted, may persist in the case with individualspecific uncertainty, even if it would have been rejected in both periods under certainty. But will trade-reform ever be enacted in the case with individual-specific uncertainty if it would have been rejected under certainty? There are two reasons why this may be the case in FR's trade-model. The more realistic one is that a majority of workers may end up losing a little from reform and a minority gaining a lot; this implies rejection by a majority under certainty but acceptance with individual-specific uncertainty if those workers who will end up losing a little believe that there is a chance of them being among the winners. The second and more interesting reason is that workers actually like individual-specific uncertainty. This is because they enjoy the upside potential of the uncertainty without having to bear the downside risk as they always have the option of staying in the sector they worked in originally should they find out that their uncertain net income in the sector gaining from reform is too low.
To be more precise assume, like FR, that workers are risk-neutral and that individual-specific uncertainty arises because they will find out about their cost of switching to the sector gaining from trade-reform only after reform has been passed for the first time.
Clearly, this implies that workers will only change sector if their switching-cost turns out to be below some threshold; if the cost is high, workers will simply stay in the sector they worked in originally. Workers' payoff if trade-reform is enacted is therefore a convex function of their switching-cost. Hence, assuming that workers know the distribution of switching-costs in the population, their expected utility of enacting trade-reform may be positive, even if ex-post utility is negative for more than half of the values of the switchingcost (Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz (1970) ). Trade-reform may therefore be enacted with individual-specific uncertainty, even if it would have been rejected by a majority had workers known their switching-cost. Moreover, trade-reform may be enacted with individual-specific uncertainty even if it would have been rejected by a majority had workers known their switching-cost, because the median of the switching-cost may be higher than its expected value. The reasons why, in FR's trade-model, reform once enacted may be sustained in the second period (when workers have found out about their switchingcost), even if it would not have been enacted had workers known their switching-cost, are twofold. The more interesting reason is that, in the case with individual-specific uncertainty, some of the workers who would have voted against enacting trade-reform had they known their switching-cost, will nevertheless go to work in the sector that gains in the first period and vote against revoking trade-reform in the second period. These workers would have voted against trade-reform had they known their switching-costs in the beginning of the first period, because they prefer to stay in the sector they work in before reform at before trade-reform prices rather than work in the sector that gains from reform at after trade-reform prices. Once trade-reform has been passed, however, workers will compare working in the two sectors at after trade-reform prices. As reform implies that relative prices change in favour of the sector that gains, switching becomes relatively more attractive after trade-reform is in place. To complete the argument it is important to note that workers will not consider the effect of their first-period switching-decision on voting outcomes as they anticipate that their individual vote is inconsequential for trade-reform being sustained or revoked in the future. A second, less interesting reason why tradereform may be sustained in the second period in FR's trade-model, even if it would not have been enacted in the first period had voters known their switching-cost, is that FR assume that there may be a sunk-cost of switching sector.
The main point made in this paper is related to the literature on policy persistence and the recent work by Coate and Morris (1999) . 4 Like this paper, Coate and Morris (CM) emphasize that " [w] hen an economic policy is introduced, agents will often respond by undertaking actions in order to benefit from it. These actions will translate […] into political pressure to retain the policy […] ." There are, however, major differences between the present paper and FR on the one hand and CM on the other. First, CM suppose that voters do not decide directly on the policy; instead, decisions are taken by an elected politician. Second, they assume that the policy only benefits politicians and firms but not voters (who would therefore always reject the policy if they were to vote on it directly). Third, CM assume that firms have to incur a switching-cost every time they change sector competitive, two-sector economy. They present both a one and two-period model, which will be discussed in detail in the next two sections. These workers must now decide whether to incur c i to actually go to work in sector X .
The Static Model
Evidently, they will, at this point, switch to sector X if and only if the resulting wageincrease is greater than their individual-specific cost of switching. This implies that their end-of-period payoff would be
where P X + and w X + denote the price of good X and the wage in sector X after tradereform. The end-of-period payoff of workers initially in sector Y if trade-reform is rejected
5 FR interpret the common cost as a sector-specific human-capital investment that must be made to be able to switch sector and the individual-specific cost as capturing sector-specific productivity-differences. 6 There is a slight ambiguity in FR on whether workers know the distribution of individual-specific costs among the whole population or among workers in the their sector. Implicitly they are assuming that workers know the distribution among workers in their sector.
 9  where P X * denotes the price of good X before trade-reform. Recall that in the case with individual-specific uncertainty about switching-costs at the time workers have to vote, it is assumed that workers only know the distribution of c among workers in their sector. 
If (3) holds and trade-reform is passed, then workers initially in sector Y will incur θ and find out about their actual individual-specific cost of switching. If their individual-specific cost turns out to be lower than the wage-increase from switching to sector X , they will switch sector. If (3) does not hold, then workers in sector Y will all vote against tradereform.
In the case without uncertainty about individual-specific costs of switching between sectors, the end-of-period payoff of workers initially in sector Y with individual-specific cost c i is
if trade-reform is passed. The difference between (4) and (1) arises because, in the case without individual-specific uncertainty, workers will incur θ only if they end up switching sector. Combining (4) c , see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . Another reason why the two conditions are consistent is that the mean of the distribution of c i may be lower than the median (the distribution may be skewed to the left).
2.2
The Two-Period Model In the static model there is no status quo bias introduced by individual-specific uncertainty as individual-specific uncertainty may lead to trade-reform being passed in instances where it would not have passed without it. FR therefore consider a two-period version of their trade-model to establish a status quo bias. In the two-period model, workers vote twice on trade-reform: in the beginning of the first period and, again, in the beginning of the second period. Trade-reform can be reversed costlessly and decisions are still made by majorityrule. Immediately after trade-reform has been enacted in the first period, workers decide on whether to incur the cost θ necessary to have the option of switching to sector X .
Immediately after θ has been incurred, they decide on whether to also incur the individual- In the case with individual-specific uncertainty, they only know θ and the distribution of i c among workers in their sector in the beginning of the first period; they find out about i c only if trade-reform is passed and they incur θ .
The possible equilibrium outcomes in the two-period model are: trade-reform is rejected in the first and in the second period (no trade-reform); trade-reform is passed in the first period and revoked in the second period (temporary trade-reform); and trade-reform is passed in the first period and not revoked in the second period (permanent trade-reform).
7
The next table compares equilibrium outcomes with and without individual-specific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period. 
holds constitute a strict majority of all workers in the economy; δ ≥ 0 denotes the discount rate applied to second period payoffs and * V is defined in (2). In this case, trade-reform will be rejected in the first period and in the second period if there is no individual-specific  13  uncertainty in the beginning of the first period. This is because (6) implies that permanent trade-reform makes a strict majority of workers worse off than no trade-reform. 
In this case, all workers in sector Y will vote for trade-reform in the case with individualspecific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period if they believe that trade-reform will not be revoked in the second period if passed in the first period. 9 Workers' beliefs that trade-reform, if passed in the first period, will not be revoked in the second period will be rational if workers in sector Y who do not switch to sector X in the first period (after trade-reform has been passed) are a minority, i.e. less than half of all workers in the economy. This is because all workers who work in sector X at the end of the first period will support trade-reform in the beginning of the second period, independently of whether they have always been working in sector X or whether they switched from sector Y . Third, suppose that workers i in sector Y for whom
holds are a minority. This implies that, if trade-reform has been enacted in the first period and workers believe that trade-reform will not be revoked in the second period, then workers who switch to sector X plus workers already in sector X will be a majority in the beginning of the second period. Workers' beliefs that trade-reform, if passed in the first period, will not be revoked in the second period are therefore rational if (8) are a minority (majority) of all workers in the economy. In this case, not enough workers support trade-reform with certainty about individual-specific costs in the beginning of the first period. But, with individual-specific uncertainty in the beginning of the first period, trade-reform is passed in the first period and not revoked in the second period if workers believe that trade-reform will not be revoked in the second period if passed in the first period.
It is straightforward to see why the second condition is consistent with the third condition: the smaller the number of people with high individual-specific switching-costs, 
holds are a minority. In this case, if workers in sector Y support trade-reform in the beginning of the first period in the case with individual-specific uncertainty, then they must necessarily believe that trade-reform will not be revoked in the beginning of the second period. To see this note first that workers initially in sector Y will always incur θ if they voted for enacting trade-reform in the beginning of the first period. Hence, their decision of changing sector is based on the individual-specific cost of switching only. Once they have incurred θ their net gain of switching to sector Y is equal to XiY wcw + −− if they believe that trade-reform will be revoked in the second period. Hence, the condition in (9) implies that if trade-reform is enacted, then workers who stay in sector Y in the first period and vote against trade-reform in the beginning of the second period will be a minority, even if all workers were to believe that trade-reform would be revoked in the second period.
Consequently, it would be irrational for workers in sector Y to support trade-reform in the beginning of the first period and at the same time believe that trade-reform will be revoked in the beginning of the second period.
4 Summary Can individual-specific uncertainty lead to a bias against efficiency-enhancing economic policies? The first point made in this paper is that individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of policies benefiting a majority ex-post being rejected ex-ante. This is true, however, whether these economic policies increase or decrease aggregate efficiency.
Individual-specific uncertainty may therefore decrease the probability that efficiencyenhancing policies are enacted but, at the same time, increase the probability that enacted policies are efficiency-enhancing. The main point made in the paper is that individualspecific uncertainty can actually strictly increase the chances of a permanent trade-reform in FR's dynamic trade-model. The reason is that trade-reform, once enacted, may not be revoked in future elections (when workers no longer face any individual-specific uncertainty) even if trade-reform would not have been enacted in the first place without individual-specific uncertainty. This is because trade-reform increases the relative price of the good produced in the sector gaining from reform. Some workers will therefore go to work in the sector that gains once reform has been passed and uncertainty has been resolved (even if they have not incurred any sunk cost), although they would have voted against enacting trade-reform in the first place had there been no uncertainty. These  17  workers will vote against revoking trade-reform in future elections. This argument generalizes to voting on any type of reform. In a realistic setting, reform will increase the incentives of agents to move into those economic activities that have benefited from the new economic policies. Some agents will therefore move into these economic activities once reform has been passed, even if they would have voted against reform without individual-specific uncertainty. Hence, support in favor of sustaining reform once individual-specific uncertainty has been resolved will be greater than support for enacting reform if there is no individual-specific uncertainty. Individual-specific uncertainty may therefore increase the chances of permanent reform.
 18 
